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This  paper  --  a product  of  thc  Public  Scctor  Managemcnt  anzd Private  Scctor  Development  Divisionl,
Country  Economics  Dcpartrmcnt  -is  part  ol'a  largercffori  in P'RE  to:  (1)  asscss  the divcstiture  expericice
to datc;  (2)  detcrmine  tihc factors  thial lcd to its succcss  or  failurc;  and  (3)  suggest  how  thic World  Banki and
its  borrowers  ma)  effectivel)  use  divestiturc  as  a public  policy  teol  to cnhancc  cconomic  development.
This  paper  is  a revised  version  of  a research  proposal  that  the  World  Bankls  Researclh  Committec  has
approved  for  funding.  Workl implentiiiilng  thic proposed  methodology  is underway  in Chile,  Mexico,  tlle
U.K.,  and  Malaysia.Copies  of  this  paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,
Washinigton  DC  2(433.  Please  contact  Gloria  Orraca-Tettch  ,room  N9-069,  extension  37646  (31  pages).
Thc  economic  rationale  for  divestiture  rests  on  Galal  suggests  that  to tease  causalitv  out  of
iwo  propositions:  that  it will  improve  firms'  the  limited  data  thiat exists  on  this  rclatively
productive  efficicncy  and  that it  will  reduice  the  receint phicnomlcnol,  anal)  sts  compare  datl  on:
budgetary  burden  that  public  enterprises  inipose.
- Th.'  same  cnierprise  before  and  al'tcr
But  there  hias  been  almost  no  empirical  divestiture.
analysis  of  what  actually  happens  after  divesti-
ture,  of  which  cntcrprises  arc desiraiblc  candi-  o  Divested  and  undivcstcd  fimis  in the  samc
dates,  and  under  wOhat  conditicns  divcstiture  sector  and  samc  country.
might  improve  a counlr)y's  economic  perf-or-
mance.  *  The  performancc  of  tic  divested  ftrm  and  an
explicit  countcrfactual  (the  hypothetical  perfor-
Galal  provides  an  analytical  frameAork  mance  of  the  firm  had  it remained  public).
(partial  equilibrium  analysis)  for  assessing  tiese
basic  argumcnts  anid evalualting  thic lessons of  *  The  performance  of divested  firms  in
cxperiencc.  competitivc  and  noncompetitive  markefs  in thc
same  country.
To  avoid  the  shiortcomings  of  the  few  studies
that  have  becn done,  Galal  says  thrce  qluestions  he  Tle  pcrformance  of  divested  firms  in the
must  bc  asked:  What  are  the  changes  in eco-  same  industr)  but  diffcrent  countries.
nomic  efficienc)  and  Fiscal incidence,  if any"
What  possible  factors explain  divestiture  out-
comes'?  What  is the  causal  linlk betwcen  out-
comes  and  their  hypothetical  detenninants'?
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Affairs Complex.An  objectis  \  of the sCries is to get thesc findings  out quickl'..e cn  if presentations  are less  than fully polishe(l.
The findings,  interpreaions.  and conmlusions in thesc papers  do not  necessarily  represent  official  Rank policy.
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REFERENCESDOES DIVESTITURE  HATTER?
A FRAMEWORK FOR LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTIONI/
Transferring ownership and control of enterprises from the public to the
private sector has recently attracted great interest around the world.
Several developed and developing countries have already divested varying
portions of their public enterprise (PE) sectors,  2/  and many others are
planning to follow suit.  In addition, some international organizations have
been actively supporting divestiture in most of their borrower countries. 3 /
Political and ideological justifications aside, the economic rationale
for divestiture rests primarily on two empirically verifiable propositions:
1.  Divestiture will improve productive efficiency at the level of the
firm.
1/ This paper  is a revised  version of a research proposal,  which was
approved by the World Bank's Research Committee in  August 1989 (Galal, 1989).
Work is underway in 5 countries: the U.K, Malaysia, Togo, Mexico, and Chile.
The author  would like to acknowledge  valuable comments by M. Shirley, J.
Nellis, L. Jones, J. Linn, B. Balassa, C. Frischtak, P. Guislain, A. Gelb, and
B. Lee, and secretarial assistance by G. Orraca-Tetteh.
2/ These include such developed countries as the U.K., France, Spain,
Italy, New Zealand, and Canada and such developing countries as Chile,
Bangladesh, Jamaica, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Togo.
31 The World Bank, for instance,  has supported divestiture programs in
some 35 countries, as of June 1989.-2-
2.  it  will -tduce  the  budgetary  burden  posed  by PEs.
To date, however, little rigorous empirical enalysis has been undertaken to
substantiate the arguments for  divestiture, or to construct an empirically
based set of stylized conditions under which divestiture  may or may not work,
paxticularly in developing countries.  Ao a result,  while convinced of the
theoretical plausibility of the benefits of divestiture,  many observers
continue to lack the supporting evidence to answer such basic questions as:
what happens in the  wake of divestiture,  which enterprises--from a country's
perspective--are desirable candidates, and, most important, under what
conditions  will divestiture contribute  positively to a country's economic
performance?
This paper provides an analytical framework for assessing the arguments
for divestiture and for evaluating the lessons of experience. Its aim is to
provide researchers with a mechanism (approach,  means) to analyze the
divestiture phenomenon more rigorously than has been attempted thus far.
Ultimately, the findings of such analysis  will enable policymakers to form
more realistic expectations about the results from urdertaking divestiture
decisions and the "onditions  necessary for attaining the maximum benefits from
the application of this instrument.
'rganizationally,  this paper summarizes the rationale for divestiture,
reviews (albeit  not comprehensively) the empirical evidence, and then proposes
a framework for undertaking an empirical investigation of the performance _f
divested firms. The paper is confined to partial equilibrium analysis, even-3-
though  it addresses  the  fiscal  impact  of  divestiture.  It  assumes  a  small
sample  setting,  thus  precluding  econometric  analysis.  The  paper's  overall
objecive  is  to construct  a framework  for  assessing  the  advantages  and
disadvantages  resulting  from  the  sale  of  a single  enterprise,  not  for
assessing  a country's  overall  divestiture  program.'
DIVESTITURE  RATIONALE
The  growing  interest  in  divestiture  stems  in  part  from  increasing
dissatisfaction  with the  performance  of  PEs  and  the  exhaustion  of goverrnent
resources  to support  their  alleged  ir-t  ficiency.  These  assertions,  even if
rigoro,isly  confirmed,  certainly  suggest  that  PEs  ought  to  be reformed  more
effectively,  but they  do not  necessarily  make the  case  for  divestiture.
Divestiture  finds  its  strongest  argument  in the  claims  that (1)  it  will
improve  productive  efficiency  by  maximizing  output  and  minimizing  input  within
the  firm,  and (2)  it  will reduce  the  budgetary  burden  of PEs. 5'/
4/  It  could  be argued  that  the  assessment  of an overall  divestiture
program  is  nothing  but  summing  across  the  assessment  of individual  cases.
This,  however,  is only  true  in  part.  Partial  equilibrium  analysis  excludes
general  equilibrium  effects  by definition.
"' Divestiture,  it  is also  claimed,  will  achieve  other  objectives:  (1)
greater  access  to private-sector  financing,  (2)  broader  share  ownership,  (3)
faster  development  of  capital  markets,  (4)  enhancement  of competition,  and (5)
reduction  of the  administrative  burden  on the  government  bureaucracy.  These
objectives  are  not treated  in  this  paper  as the  primary  objectives  of
divestiture  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  most  of them,  it can  be argued,
could  equally,  and  perhaps  more effectively,  be achieved  via alternative
instruments--e.g.,  financial  sector  reform  and  deregulation.  Second,  from  an
analytical  point  of view,  most of  these  objectives  are  not  ends in  themselves.
Rather,  they  are  instruments  to improve  efficiency.  Viewing  them  as  objectives
rather  than  instruments  in  a framework  that  aims  at assessing  the  performance
of divested  firms  under  varying  conditions  of  market  structures,  capital-4-
The  Economic  Efficiency  Ar2ument
Adam  Smith  asserted  the  connection  between  ownership  and  efficiency.
However,  the  claim  that  private  owners  are  inherently  more efficient  than
public  owners  is seldom  treated  in  neo-clajsical  microeconomic  theory.  This
theory  is essentially  silent  on the  role  of ownership  in determining  efficient
outcomes.  To be sure,  it  suggests  a role  for  the  government  to  play to
compensate  for  incidents  of  market  failure  (e.g.,  externalities,  public  goods,
increasing  returns,  asymmetrical  information).  However,  it leaves  the  form  of
government  intervention  open  to include  direct  ownership  of resources,
regulation,  subsidy,  and  tax  schemes.
The  theoretical  justification  for  the  claim  that  divestiture  will
improve  productive  efficiency  rests  on extending  to PEs  the  arguments
developed  by the  schools  of  property  rights,  public  choice,  and  X-efficiency
(e.g.,  Hanke,  1986;  Yarrow,  1989;  Niskanen,  1971;  Leibenstein,  1978;  Galal,
1986).  The  basic  logic  of this  literature  can  be stated  as follows:
Ownerei.ip  is divorced  from  management  in PEs  and  large  private
corporaticas  alike.  Therefore,  managers  of  both  organizations  are  likely
to  maximize  objectives  different  from,  and  often  incompatible  with,
profit  maximization.  But  the  deviation  from  profit  maximization,  it is
market  regimes,  etc.,  could  lead  to  a simultaneity  problem.  For  a discussion
of these  objectives,  however,  see  Hemming  and  Mansoor,  1988.-5-
argued,  is likely  to  be  more substantial  in  PEe  than  in their  private
countetparts."'
The  additional  deviation  stems  in  principle  from  the  limited
accountability  of  politicians  to the  public  at large  and/or  the  inherent
inability  of  public  agencies  to effectively  monitor  managerial  performance  and
provide  adequate  incentives  for  improved  efficiency.  ?resumably,  the  limited
accountability  arises  from  imperfections  in the  political  system,  while  the
organizational  failure  stems  primarily  from  the  complicated  hierarchy  of
public  agencies,  information  asymmetry,  and  the  possible  coalition  between  PE
managers  and  civil  servants  to secure  better  pay,  pover,  and  prestige  o; to
simply  lead  a  tranquil  life.
Further  exacerbating  these  failures  is  the  reality  that  PE  managers
usually  escape  the  discipline  of financial  markets,  including  the  threat  of
takeover.  For  political  and  social  reasons,  they  are  se:  - liquidated.
Instead,  they  are  largely  cushioned  by a soft  budget  constraint,  and
preferential  access  to  domestic  and  foreign  credit.
Divestiture,  it is  argued,  will reverse  many  of these  conditions.
Divested  f'.rms  will  be free  from  problems  inherent  to PEs:  political
interference,  multiple  objectives,  bureaucratic  failure,  and,  to some  degree,
information  impactedness.  As assets  become  freely  tradable,  the  new  owners
6/  In  contrast  to the  profit  maximization  postulate  in  neo-classical
microeconomic  theory,  Niskanen  (1971)  suggests  that  PE managers  maximize  their
budget;  Galal  (1986)  suggests  that  they  maximize  their  utility  subject  to
prevailing  political  and  bureaucratic  constraints;  Williamson  (1963)  suggests
that  managers  in  large  private  corporations  maximize  their  utility;  and
Leibenstein  (1978)  questions  whether  individuals  maximize  at all.-6-
will face  the  threat  of takeover  and  bankruptcy. They  will  have  to raise
capital,  through  their  agents  (i.e.,  managers),  in  the  financial  market  based
on the  merit  of their  enterprises.  In short,  divestiture  will internalize  the
benefits  from  and  the  costs  of ownership.  It  will substitute  interested
shareholders  for  uninterested  bureaucrats,  thus  motivating  the  new  owners  to
devise  more  effective  mechcniams  to ensure  the  profitability  and  long-term
value  of their  firm.
From  society's  standpoint,  the  above  arguments  are  compelling  for
divesting  PEs  operating  in competitive  markets.  However,  the  argument  does  not
equally  apply  to firma  operating  in  noncompetitive  markets.  In the  latter
case,  the  possible  gains  in  productive  efficiency  have  to be  weighed  against
the  potential  loss  in allocative  efficiency. 7
1 In situations  where  incidents
of  market  failure  (induced  or natural)  are  widespread,  where  capital  markets
are  underdeveloped,  where  the  institutional  capacity  of governments  to
regulate  private  monopolies  is  limited,  where  entrepreneurs  are  in short
supply,  and  where  policy  changes  to increase  competition  are  not  enacted,  the
allocative  inefficiency  that  could  res"lt  from  divesting  monopolistic  firms
could  be substantial.  If these  losses  exceed  the  potential  gain  in  productive
'I  In a  partial  equilibrium  context,  "allocative  efficiency"  in
consumption  refers  to situations  in  which  the  consumers  are  provided  with the
quantity  and  quality  of output  they  most  value,  given  production  decisions.  In
a general  equilibrium  context,  an  allocation  is said  to be efficient  (Pareto
optimal)  if the  existing  resources  in  the  economy  ca.  not  be reallocated
without  making  somebody  worse  off.  In this  paper,  the  term  "allocative
efficiency"  will be used  henceforth  to refer  to  the former  definition.-7-
efficie,cy,  society  may  be  better  off  following  a course  of action  other  than
divestiture.8/
The  Fiscal  Argument
Preliminary  inquiries  suggest  that  the  not fiscal  impact  of  divesting  an
enterprise  depends  primarily  on: (a)  the  value  of the  assets  sold;  (b)  the
increase  or decrease  in  productivity  resulting  from  the  transfer  of ownership;
(c)  the  budgetary  impact  of the  PE being  divested;  and (d)  the  way governments
use  their  receipts  from  the  sale (Hemming  and  Mansoor,  1988;  Heller  and
Schiller,  1988).  In  the  simplest  hypothetical  case,  if the  buyers  pdid  a price
equal  to the  discounted  stream  of  net  revenues  the  Treasury  would  receive
under  continued  public  ownership,  if  the  change  in  ownership  left  efficiency,
profitability,  and  income  taxes  unaffected,  and  if  the  PE  being  sold  had
imposed  no burden  on the  government  budget,  divestiture  would  merely  change
the  government's  liquidity  position,  but  not its  wealth.  Put  differently,  the
government  would  have  substituted  liquid  assets  for  equity.  The  overall
budgetary  balance  would  have improved  today,  but  at the  expense  of future
balances.  In  this  case,  divestiture  woul.4  have  no impact  on public  finance  in
the  long  run.
However,  neutrality  of the  fiscal  incidence  of divestiture  is  unlikely;
three  good  r.rguments  have  been  advanced  to  suggest  a favorable  effect.  First,
81  In suggesting  this,  the  feasibility  and  costs  of adopting  other  modes
of reform  are  assumed  to  be less  than  those  associated  with divesting  a
monopoly.  Where  this  assumption  does  not  hold,  this  conclusion  must  be
modified  accordingly.on the  expectation  that  they  can  increase  profitability,  the  buyers  may  pay
the  government  a  price  higher  than  the  discounted  stream  of  profits  that  the
Treasury  would  receive  under  continued  public  ownership.  Second,  PEG often
impose  a burden  on the  Treasury,  which  will  now  be alleviated. 9' Third,  facing
fiscal  imbalances,  governments  would  be pressured  to use  the  proceeds  from  the
sale  to  effectively  reduce  the  budget  deficit.
From  a fiscal  point  of  view,  *hese  arguments  are  compelling  for
divesting  an enterprise.  However,  there  is  no assurance  that  these
expectations  would  mate-ialize. For  example,  because  of favoritism,
governments  may strike  a deal  in  which  the  private  sector  purchaser  actually
pays  a price  lower  than  the  Treasury  would  receive  under  continued  public
ownership.  Productivity  and  profitability  gains  may  not  materialize,
especially  if the  private  owner  is  able  to  attain  comfortable  profit  margins
in  sheltered  markets.  The  PE being  divested  may have  been  a positive
contributor  to the  government  budget.  Governments  may  perceive  the  proceeds
form  the  sale  as  windfall  revenues,  thus  increasing  public  expenditure.
THE  EMPIRICAL  GAP
In  view  of the  uncertainties  surrounding  the  efficiency  and  fiscal
consequences  of divestiture,  empirical  verification  is  crucial. However,  as
Jones  et al.  note:  "Nowhere  in  the  world  are  we able  to find  even  a single
9/  Judging  from  several  studies  in  LDCs,  there  is  substantial  evidence  in
support  of the  notion  that  PEe  impose  a heavy  burden  on the  government  budget.
See, for  example,  Floyd  et al., 1984,  and  Nair  ard  Filippides,  1988.-9-
serious  and  balanced  study  of  what actually  happened  in the  wake of
divestiture"  (forthcoming).
Although the situation  has improved somewhat sir.ce  this observation was
made,  the  emerging  empirical  evidence  either  addresses  questions  other  than
those  raised  above  or,  with a few  exceptions,  addresses  them  unsatisfactorily.
A large  part  of the  empirical  evidence  describes  reasons  why governments  have
opted  for  divestiture  and  how it  has  been  carried  out (e.g.,  Vuylsteke  et al.,
1988;  Leeds,  1987;  Wilson,  1987;  Lorch,  1988;  Christiansen  and  Stackhouse,
1987). The  prtmary  goal  of this  literature  is to  advise  policymakers  on how
to implement  a divestiture  program,  once  a decis'on  to civest  has  been  made.
Therefore,  despite  its  importance,  this  literature  neither  systematically
addresses  how  divestiture  has  affected  the  performance  of divested  firms  nor
does it  attempt  to link  outcomes  to  their  causal  factors.
Some  few  studies  have  gone  beyond  an analysis  of the  nature  of
transactions.  For  example,  Foreman-Peck  and  Manning  (1988)  compared  the
performance  of  British  Telecom  (BT),  which  was divested  in 1984,  with the
performance  of fivs  telecom  firms  in  Europe,  using  Total  Factor  Productivity
(TFP)  analysis. They  concluded  that  "BT  is  apparently  less  efficient  ...  than
[the  telecom  companies  in]  both  Norway  [where  the  company  is state-owned]  and
Denmark  [where  ownership  is  mixed]  but  more efficient  than [the  telecom
companies  in]  Spain  and  Italy  [where  ownership  is  mixed]."  In another
systematic  study,  Bishop  and  Kay (1988)  compared  the  performance  of a  number
of divested  firms  in the  U.K.  with  the  performance  of a number  of firms  that
continued  under  public  owrership.  The  authors  used  several  indicators  in  their-10-
assessment,  including  revenue,  employment,  profits,  profit  margins,  and  TFP.
Their  main conclusion  is that  divested  firms  experienced  an increase  in
kevenua.  profits,  profit  margins,  and  a  positive  TFP,  but so  did  the firms
that  continued  undar  public  ownership.
While  these  two  studies  are  interesting  in their  o--n  right,  they  suffer
from  some  methodological  problems.  By focusing  on cross-section  data  for  a
number  of f;rms  in  the  telecom  industry  in  Europe,  Foreman-Peck  and  Manning
were able  to assess  the  effect  of the  variations  in size  and  technology  on
performance,  but  were unable  to link  the  variations  in  BT's  performance  with
the  change  in  the  company's  ownership.  Similarly,  by focusing  on a comparison
between  a diverse  group  of  divested  firms  (in  the  shipping,  airline,  gas,
telecom, oil, and automobile industries)  and another diverse group of
enterprises  under  continued  public  ownership  (in  the  coal,  rail,  steel,  and
postal sectors), Bishop's and Kay's  results  with regard to the effect of the
change  in  ownership  are  masked  by large  variations  in the  underlying  market
structure  and  technology  in  the  two  groups  of firms.  Moreover,  neither  study
analyzed  the  impact  of  divestiture  on allocative  efficiency  and  the  budget.
Despite  these  limitations,  these  are  the  only  such  rigorous  studies  of post-
divestiture  experience  that  could  be found.  No similar  studies  at the  firm
level  could  be found  for  LDCs.
There is, finally, the empirical literature comparing the performance of
public and private enterprises in the same industries and/or across-11-
countries. 101 This literature  doos  not  directly  address  divestiture  per se.
Nonetheless,  its  view  of the  performance  of  private  versus  public  ownership  is
relevant;  Milward's  conclusion  is generally  shared  by the  other  authors  who
have  made the  attempt:  "There  is no evidence  of  a statistically  satisfactory
kind to suggest  that  public  enterprises  in  LDCs  have  a lower  level  of
technical  efficiency  than  private  firms  operating  at the  same  scale  of
operation"  (Milward,  1988).
PROPOSED  FRAMEWORK
To go beyond,  or  avoid  the  shortcomings  of the  above  studies,  we need to
ask  three  questions  about  divestiture.  The  first  is factual:  What are  the
changes  in economic  efficiency  and  fiscal  incidence,  if  any?  The  second  is
hypothetical:  What are  the  possible  factors  explaining  divestiture  outcomes?
The third  is  analytical:  What is  the  causal  link  between  divestiture  outcomes
and  their  hypothetical  determinants?
Measurement  Issues
Economic  Efficiency The  hypothetical  cases  in Figures  1  and  2 identify
the  expected  changes  in  economic  efficiency.  The  underlying  premise  of  the
two  simplified  cases  is that,  for  reasons  mentioned  above,  divestiture  will
l01 For  surveys  of this  literature,  see,  for  example,  Milward,  1988;
Domberger  and  Piggott,  1986;  and  Svejnar  and  Hariga,  1987.-12-
lead  to  a reduction  in averaae  costs  (Cp<Cg).  For  purposes  of simplification,
we can  assume  the  following:
o  The  marginal,  and  consequently  average,  costs  are  constant  under
public  (Cg)  and  private  (Cp)  ownerships.
O  The firm  operates  at  a given  short-run  capacity  before  and  after
divestiture.
o  Under  public  ownership,  the  firm  is  assumed  to  break-even
(Pg-Cg).11/
Under  perfect  competition  (Fig.  1),  the  consumers  are  only  willing  to
pay the  market  price,  whether  the  commodity  is produced  publicly  or privately
(Pg - Pp).  The  PE is  merely  able  to recover  its  total  costs  (revenue  cost  =
ABQgO).  In contrast,  private  producers  are  able  to  make  profits  equal  to  ABCD
(reverue  ABQpO  - cost  DCQpO)." 2 I  The  consumer's  surplus  remains  unchanged.
Therefore, the expected net gain to society  is captured by the change in the
producer's  surplus  (ABCD).
"I  Many of these  assumptions  need  not  hold.  Private  owners  may, in
addition  to cost  reduction,  be able  to increase  output  through  greater
capacity  utilization  even  in the  short  run.  Marginal  costs  could  be increasing
or decreasing.  Market  structures  may  be oligopolistic.  Firms  may enjoy  a
monopsony  power  in input  markets.  These  variations  are  likely  to complicate
the  story  considerably,  however,  without  substantially  altering  the  basic
notion  to  be illustrated  here.
12/  Profit,  as defined  here,  is the  same  as producer's  surplus  or quasi-
rent.  Therefore,  these  terms  will  be used  interchangeably,  unless  specified
otherwise.-13-
Fig.  1:  Divestiture  of PEs  under  Competition
p
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Fig.  2:  Divestiture  of PEs  under  Monopoly
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Under a monopoly (Fig. 2), the effect of divestiture is not as
straightforward. To maximize their profits, the new owners are expected to
reduce output (from  Qg to Qp) and raise the selling price (from  Pg to Pp)."'1
Compared with a zero producer's surplus under public ownership (revenue - cost
- CgBQgO), profits under private ownership are expected to go up to PpADCp.
Because average cost is expected to decline (from Cg to Cp), part of the
increase in profits is attributed to efficiency improvements (CgCDCp),  while
another part is attained at the expense of the consumers (PpACCg).
Traditionallv, the latter is assumed to be a  mere transfer from the consumers
to the producers."' Therefore, the net gain in productive efficiency is the
area CgCDCp. Consumers would have lost the area  ABC, without making anybody
else better off. Therefore, the expected net gain to society depends on the
magnitude of the efficiency gains (CgCDCp)  minus the loss in consumer's
surplus (ABC).
The above analysis compares the operation of an enterprise for one
period under public ownership versus another period under private ownership.
Clearly, this view is inadequate.  A firm's lifetime goes beyond one period;
losses in one period could be recovered in another. Moreover, the benefits
from divestiture could only  materialize after private entrepreneurs have
enough time to adjust. Therefore, static changes in the producer's and
"I  Two  assumptions are necessary for this outcome to attain: (1)
government exercising price control over the output of the PE, and (2)  no or
ineffective price regulation following the transfer of assets to the private
sector.
"I  Unless, of course, distributional effects are taken into account and
various transfers are valued differently, depending on their recipients.-15-
consumer's  surplus  should  be extended  to span  a firm's  life  cycle.  Indeed,
that  is  why Jones  et  al. (forthcoming)  suggest  that  the  desirability  of
divestiture  should  be judged  on the  basis  of the  value  of the  sum  of the
discounted  changes  in  the  producer's  and  consumer's  surplus  compared  to  their
level  under  public  ownership."I  If the  sum  is  higher  than  zero,  then
divestiture  is advantageous  to society.
The  analysis  of the  producer's  surplus,  when undertaken  in  constant
prices  over  time,  will  reflect  the  effect  of static  as  well as dynamic  changes
within  the  firm;  the  latter  may include  introducing  new  products  and
penetrating  new  markets.  It  will  be useful  nonetheless  to supplement  this
analysis  by estimating  TFP  and  financial  profitability.  The  reason  is that  TFP
analysis  distinguishes  the  contribution  to the  growth  rate  of  real  output  of
various  inputs  from  the  contribution  of productivity  improvements."'I  Financial
profitability  (which  is  defined  as the  percentage  of profits,  before  and  after
taxes,  to  net  worth,  sales,  and  capital  employed)  is  useful  because  it
captures--s.iort  of subsidies--the  degree  of responsiveness  of the  private
owners  and  managers  to  market  signals  compared  to their  public  sector
predecessors.
"I  This  statement  leaves  aside  from  the  formulation  of Jones  et  al.
(forthcoming)  the  shadow  multiplier  for  government  revenue.  The  fiscal  impact
of divestiture  is  addressed  separately  below.
6/  This  is so since  TFP is  calculated,  in one  variant,  by subtracting  the
contribution of factor and intermediate inputs from total oiutput  growth; in
turn, the contribution of factor and intermediate inputs can be derived by
calculating a weighted average growth  using the respective share of inputs in
cost as  weights. If the residual is positive, this implies a TFP improvement.-16-
We can find much of the information  required to calculate the above
measures in the firm's income statement and balance sheet. However, this
information must be augmented by information on prices  and quantities of major
inputs and outputs, and on capacity utilization. Equipped  with this
information,  we can calculate the producer's surplus by subtracting from the
sum of production at factor cost and net non-operating income, the costs of
intermediate inputs, employee compensation, and rental expenses.  We can then
derive the changes in the producer's surplus  as the difference between the
absolute  values of two periods. Changes in the consumer's surplus (otherwise
known as the deadweight loss) can be approximated by multiplying the change in
observed selling prices times the change in observed sold quantities and
dividing the outcome by two.' 7 I  Summed together, the changes in the producer's
and consumer's surplus provide a measure of the change in economic efficiency.
In calculating all measures, we might have a problem finding
enterprises that have been divested for an average lifetime.  Therefore, our
estimation has to proceed in two steps, First,  we should calculate the
measures for the period for which actual data are available.  And second, we
should estimate the measures for the rest of the firm's lifetime, based on
experience and some expectations about future  policy shifts and expected
responses by enterprises and consumers.
"7  Fortunately, only the change in the consumer's surplus, not the
magnitude, needs to be measured. Otherwise, the shape of the demand curve (or
its elasticity) has to be estimated.-17-
The Fiscal Incidence.  To judge  whether the fiscal incidence of
divestiture is positive or negative,  we must compare the net present value
(NPV)  of (1) the funds that would have flowed between the Treasury and the PE,
if public ownership had continued, and (2) the funds that flow between the
Treasury and the divested firm.
To make this comparison,  we must identify the flows that would have
occurred under continued public ownership, project them for the rest of the
PE's lifetime, and then discount them. In general, these flows are either
explicit or implicit, capital or operational." 1 i  Explicit transfers from the
Treasury to the PE may include: unrequited transfers (subsidies and grants),
increases in arrears of tax payments, equity injections, and long-term
lending, including foreign capital. Implicit transfers, also from the Treasury
to the PE, may include: tax exemptions and capital subsidies (e.g. grants,
lower interest rates) and import duty exemptions.  Mirroring this
classification, explicit transfers from the PE to the Treasury may include:
taxes and royalties, increases in government arrears for the enterprise's
goods and services, dividends, repayment of equity (if applicable) and long-
term borrowing, including foreign capital.  Assuming a finite firm lifetime,
these flows should also include a scrap  value. Implicit transfers, from the PE
to the Treasury, may include: the cost of fulfilling  non-commercial
objectives,--e.g., lower selling prices, excess employment, and provision of
social  services.,'"
"I  These  flows  have  been  identified  in  details  in  Floyd,  et  al.,  1984.
19/  The  assumption  here  is  that  had  PEs not  rendered  these  services, the
government  would  have  had  to  do  so.-18-
We  :an  use the same framework to estimate the NPV of the flows resulting
from divestiture.  However, we should use this framework as a checklist to
which ac9ditional  items should be added and subtracted. For example, following
divestiture, explicit transfers from the Treasury to the divested firm are not
likely to include operational subsidies or capital injections. Yet, they
should include the budgetary outlayo  necessitated by divestiture (the cost of
the administrative process, financial and physical restructuring, labor
severance payments, re-training schemes, etc.). Similarly, implicit Treasury
transfers to the divested firm are not likely to include tax and import duty
exemptions and capital subsidies,  unless concessions  were made when the deal
was struck. Explicit transfers in the opposite direction (i.e., from the
divested firm to the Treasury)  will include the selling price, which
corresponds in some sense to the scrap value under the above framework.
Similarly,  divested firms  will not remit dividends to the Treasury, unless of
course the government had decided to retain some equity following divestiture.
Under both frameworks, corporate taxes  will appear as a transfer to the
Treasury, provided firms  were making profits.
We can get most of the information  we need to calculate the two NPVs
largely from the accoun.s of the enterpr-.e and the government budget records.
We must also estimate three parameters; the lifetime of the firm, the relevant
discounting factor in a given country, and the shadow multiplier for-19-
government  revenue. 2 01 Th-oe  parameters  are  specific  to  the firm  and  the
country.  Therefore,  we should  consider  them  on a  case-by-case  basis.
As explained  under  the  previous  section  on economic  efficiency,  we will
most likely  have trouble  finding  enterprises  that  have  been  divested  for  an
average  lifetime  of a firm.  Therefore,  the  estimation  of the  fiscal  impact
should  follow  the  same  two  steps  outlined  above.
Hypothetical  Determinants  of  Divestiture  Outcomes
Measured  outcomes  aside  for  the  moment,  several  factors  can  affect  the
performance  of divested  firms.  These  are: (1)  the  changes  the  private  sector
may introduce  in the  firm  after  divestiture,  (2)  the  characteristics  of the
sector,  (3)  the  macroeconomic  environment  (insofar  as it directly  affects
divested  firms),  and (4)  changes  in  any  of these  -. hree  factors  resulting  from
the  sale  negotiation. 2 1 '
201  It has  been  argued  that  one  dollar  in  the  hands  of the  private  sector
is  worth  more than  one  dollar  in the  hands  of the  government.  Browning  (1987)
has shown,  for  example,  that  in  the  U.S.  a dollar  in government  revenue  costs
about  $1.30  to $1.50  in terms  of real  resource  costs.  Therefore,  the  net
budgetary  impact  of divestiture  has  to  be  multiplied  by a conversion  factor,
which  should  be estimated  in  each  country  separately.
211 A fifth  factor  is  whether  the  divested  PE  was restructured  prior  to
divestiture.  Should  that  be the  case,  improved  performance  may be due  to the
restructuring  effort  and  not  to divestiture.  The  counter-argument  is that
without  divestiture,  restructuring  may  not  have taken  place.  There  is another
issue,  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper,  as to  whether  the  government  should
restructure  prior  to  sale,  to  unravel  the  marketability  of the  enterprise,  or
accept  a lower  sales  price  and  leave  the  restructuring  to the  new  owner.-20-
Private  Ownership. To  maximize  profits,  the  now  private  sector  owners
would  be expected  to introduce  observable  changes  within  the  firm.  These
changes  may includet  productior.  of new  products  and  penetration  of new
markets;  better  selection,  monitoring,  and  motivation  of managers;  more
appropriate  mix of labor  skill  and  productivity-based  compensation  schemee;
technological  rehabilitation,  replacement,  and  expansion;  higher  capacity
utilization;  reorganization  and  financial  restructuring;  better  mix and
quality  of outputs;  more  reliable  and  cheaper  sources  of inputs;  and  more
appropriate  techniques  for  managing  inventory.  The  null  hypothesis  is  to
observe  fewer  or none  of these  changes.
Sector  Characteristics.  The  characteristics  of the  divested  firm's
sector  can  cripple  or  boost  its  performance,  irrespective  of any  changes
within  the  enterprise.  The  most critical  of these  include  market  structures,
the  effectiveness  of any  relevant  regulating  agencies  and  the  appropriateness
of applied  regulatory  formulas  (if  warranted),  and  the  nature  of sector
technology.  The expectation  is that  the  more competitive  the  market  structures
(or  the  more effective  the  regulatory  arrangements  of non-competitive  markets)
and  the  more cost-saving  the  technologies,  the  greater  the  likelihood  that
divestiture  will induce  greater  efficiency  improvements.  The  converse  is also
expected  to  hold.
Macroeconomic  Environment.  Several  macroeconomic  variables  are  also
likely  to directly  affect  the  performance  of divested  firms.  These  include:
the  state  of economic  activity,  the  state  of capital  market  development,  and
corporate  tax  and  exchange  rate  policies.  For  example,  a booming  economy  would-21-
increase  demand,  thus  improve  the  performance  of all  firms,  divested  or  not.
Conv..sely,  a recession  would  shrink  demand,  thus  limiting  the  opportunity  for
domestic  sales  of  most,  if  not  all,  firms.  Similarly,  well-developed  capital
markets,  a neutral  corporate  tax  system,  and  more realistic  exchange  rate
policies  are  expected,  in turn,  to impose  financial  discipline,  promote
efficient  allocation  of resources,  and  stimulate  the  activities  of exporting
firms,  including  divested  ones.  Alternative  policiea  and  underdeveloped
capital  markets  are  expected  to have  the  opposite  effects. 22'
Negotiated  Terms.  Finally,  the  specific  details  negotiated  during  the
divestiture  transaction  can  shape  the  firm's  performance.  For  example,  in
t.riking  the  deal,  the  new  owners  may have  had  to agree  to limitations  to
their  ability  to respond  flexibly  to  market  environments  (e.g.,  the
transaction  agreement  may  restrict  firing  redundant  workers,  closing  plants,
or developing  different  markets  and  distribution  channels).  Conversely,  the
deal  is  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on the  firm's  performance  if  it
permits  the  new  owners  to turn  their  enterprises  around  as necessary.
Similarly,  divestiture  transactions  are  expected  to hurt  overall  economic
performance  if they  reduce  competition--that  is,  if they  involve  concessions
to sweeten  the  deal  (e.g.,  granting  monopoly  rights,  protection  from  imports,
tax  exemptions,  and  preferential  access  to credit  and  other  inputs).
Conversely,  divestiture  transactions  can  have  a  positive  influence  if  they  are
used to increase  competition  (e.g.,  by breaking  up  monopolies,  facilitating
221 Evidence  of divergence  between  economic  efficiency  and  financial
profitability  would  uncover  how these  policies  might  have  affected  divestiture
outcomes.-22-
exit  and  entry,  regulating  private  monopolies,  and  providing  equal  treatment
between  PEs  and  divested  firms).
Many  of these  factors  can  and  should  be quantified.  For  example,  GDP
growth  rates  can  be  used  as a proxy  to describe  the  state  of economic
activity,  and  economic  concentration  ratios  can  be  used to  classify  market
structures.  Other  factors  have  to  be assessed  qualitatively.  These  include  the
quality  of the  new  managers  and  terms  of their  contracts,  the  effectiveness  of
inventory  management  tec&iniques,  the  appropriateness  of the  regulatory
formulas  and  the  effectiveness  of their  implementing  agencies,  and  the
detailed  transaction  story  (e.g.,  the  role  played  and  concessions  won by trade
unions,  the  national  origins  of buyers,  and  modality  of  divestiture).
Issues  of  Attribution
The  next  critical  question  is:  to  what extent  are  observed  changes  in
performance  due  to the  divestiture  itself,  as  opposed  to exogenous  concurrent
factors?  For  example,  if  a divested  firm's  sales  increase  and  profits  grow  in
a time  of  macroeconomic  expansion,  is  it due  to better  management,  to
exogenous  expansion  of demand,  or to both?
Analytically,  the  answer  hinges  on the  selection  of cases  and the
choice  of a "counter-factual"--that  is,  what  would  have  happened  in the
absence  of divestiture?  The  choice  of cases  involves  a trade-off  between
studying  one  firm  in  one  country  in  detail  and  studying  many cases,  sectors,
and  countries  in  much less  depth.  The  choice  of an appropriate  counter--23-
factual,  in a  small  sample  setting,  admittedly  involves  as  much art  aS
science. 231 It inevitably  entaiL subjective  interpretation  of outcomes  and
their  causal  factors,  thus  implying  room  for  error  and  allegations  of special
pleading.
To reduce  these  limitations  and  reach  even  tentatively  generalizable  policy
conclusions,  we need  to strike  a  balance  between  depth  and  coverage.  We should
attempt  to control  for  the  various  sets  of competing  explntiatory  factors,  and
to tease  causality  out  of limited  data.  Errors  in interpretation  should  be
fully  recognized  through  sensitivity  analysis,  with  an open  data  matrix
allowing  others  to examine  how  the  conclusions  were  reached.  These  issues  are
addressed  belov  under  the  headings  "case  studies  without  apology",  "sample
selection",  and  "comparative  assessment".
Case  Studies  Without  Apology. The  alternative  to following  the  case
study  approach  is  undertaking  rigorous  econometric  analysis.  Such  analysis  is
infeasible  or inferior  in  the  present  context  for  several  reasons.  First  of
all,  it is extremely  demanding,  requiring  a larger  number  of observations  with
a sufficiently  lengthy  history  than  exists  in  most countries,  because
divestiture  is  a relatively  recent  phenomena.  It further  requires  a complete
specification  of the  divestiture  phenomenon,  which  has  yet  to be developed.
But  even if these  requirements  are  satisfied,  econometric  analysis  will still
miss  detailed  and  valuable  information  that  can  only  be captured  through
carefully  constructed  interviews  with the  owners,  workers,  rivals,  and
23/  The  problem  of attribution,  encountered  here,  is common  to any  study
that  adopts  the  case-study  approach.-24-
bureaucrats. Obvious examples include an assessment of the transparency and
fairness of the transaction process, the effectiveness of the regulatory
agency, and the appropriateness of the regulatory formulae applied (e.g.,
output pricing). Given the present state of theoretical development, there
appears to be no alternative to a case study approach;  moreover, this approach
wil'l  provide valuable contextual information that  would neither be revealed
nor analyzed in an econometric study.
To be sure, the case study approach has its own disadvantages. At one
extreme is the  well-kno.rn  problem of generalization, i.e., a  story of one firm
in a given sector and country is not necessarily relevant to other cases.
Further, the approach is incapable  of testing scatistically the sign,
relevance, and significance of the independent  variables individually. But we
can reduce these limitations by: (1) deliberately (rather  than randomly)
selecting the sample to ensure a  wide coverage and (2)  explicitly conducting
various performance comparisons in an attempt to establish causality.
Sample Selection.  In trying to select a sample that represents the
universe as much as possible at a reasonable cost, the following criteria may
be useful:
(a)  The sample should include cases from both developed and developing
countries so that performance could be contrasted under radically
different circumstances.-25-
(b)  The cases should be selected from competitive and non-competitive
market structures to permit inter-r  ctoral variations. 2
1
(c)  The cases should be sufficiently large to warrant their
investigation, but not too large to affect the whole economy
substantially. Otherwise, the partial equilibrium analysis
proposed here would be inadequate.
(d)  Selected firms should have as much post-divestiture history as
possible, so that private entrepreneurs  would have had an
opportunity to introduce  whatever adjustments they deemed
necessary.
(e)  For obvious reasons, preference should be given to divested firms
with sufficient documentation.
Comparative Assessment.  Various performance comparisons can be useful
in trying to tease causality out of limited data. (Five such comparisons are
summarized in the table below.) Each oi the comparisons is designed to control
for certain  variables, permitting the other(s) to vary. The first three are
intended to tackle the question of whether the change of ownership makes a
difference,  while the fourth and fifth are intended to explore whether
variation in sectors and macroeconomic settings effect outcomes significantly.
24"  Alternatively, the sample could be selected narrowly from one sector
(e.g., transport) in a set of developing countries.  While more manageable,
this alternative precludes the possibility of capturing the effect on
divestiture outcomes of sectoral  variations and differences between developed
and developing countries.-26-
The  first  performance  comparison  is  for  the  same  enterprise  before  and
after  divestiture.  It  builds  on the  notion  that  the  enterprise  most similar  to
the  divested  firm  is the  enterprise  itself  before  divestiture.  Therefore,  any
changes  that  may  be observed  within  the  firm  following  divestiture  could  be
largely  attributed  to  the  change  in  ownership.  This  conclusion  would
particularly  hold  when associated  with stable  macroeconomic  conditions  and
similar  sectoral  characteristics  before  and  after  divestiture.
Performance  ComRarisons  and  Most
Likely  Related  Explanatorv  Variable
PERFORMANCE  COMPARISONS
Same  Firm Divested/  Same  Divested  Divested  Firms,
Before/  Undivested  Firm  Firms,  Diff.  Sectors,
After  Firms,Same  With/  Diff.  Sectors, Diff.  Countries
Sector,Same  Without  Same  Country
VARIABLES  Country  Divest.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
1.  Ownership  x  x  x
2. Sectoral  x
Charact'B8
3.  Macroeconomic  x  x
Conditions
4.  Transaction  (Likely  to influence  outcomes  through  its  influence  on 1-3)
The  second  comparison  corresponds  to the  Bishop  and  Kay  study,  cited  above,
with one  basic  difference.  That  is,  the  comparison  proposed  here is  between
divested  and  undivested  firms  in  the  same  sector  (e.g.,  in the  textile  sector,
rather  than  in the  textile  and  electricity  sectors)  and  the  same  country
(e.g.,  Chile).  This  comparison  would  further  substantiate  the  conclusion  of-27-
the  previous  one  if it  were to reveal  a  superiority  in  the  performance  of
divested  firms  in comparison  with their  counterparts  that  remained  public.  If
the  comparison  alternatively  revealed  insignificant  differences  in
performance,  as  happened  in  the  Bishop  and  Kay study  of the  U.K.,  several
competing  explanations  are  possible:  the  economy  was booming  so that  all firms
were doing  well,  performance  improvements  of  undivested  firms  were the  result
of the  threat  of divestiture,  or a  combination  of the  two.
To sort  out  the  effect  of  the  change  of  ownership  from  other  exogenous
concurrent  factors,  such  as the  effect  of  a booming  economy,  we can  make a
third  comparison  between  the  performance  of the  divested  firm  and  an explicit
counter-factual  (i.e.,  the  hypothetical  performance  of the  divested  firm  had
it  continued  public).  The counter-factual  can  be constructed  on the  basis  of
knowledge  about  the  operation  of the  enterprise  before  its  divestiture,  the
actual  operation  of the  enterprise  once  divested,  and  additional  independent
knowledge  (e.g.,  the  state  of economic  activity,  the  income  elasticity  of
demand).
The fourth  comparison  is  between  the  performance  of divested  firms  in
competitive  and  non-competitive  markets  in the  same  country  (e.g.,  Chile).  By
permitting  sectoral  variations  (e.g.,  textile  and  electricity),  this
comparison  should  uncover  the  extent  to  which  market  structures,  regulatory
arrangements  (if  warranted),  and  technologies  made a difference.
The fifth  and  final  comparison  is between  the  performance  of divested
firms  in the  same  industry  (e.g.,  textile)  but  across  countries  (e.g.,  the-28-
U.K. and  Chile).  This  comparison  should  shed  some  light  on  whether  inter-
country  variations  (macro-settings)  made a  difference.
The conciusion  of the  five  comparisons  would  be  most compelling  if  they
were to  uncover  a  systematic  pattern  such  as the  following.  Divested  firms
performed  consistently  better  than  they  did  under  previous  public  ownership,
than  did similar  undivested  public  firms,  and  than  their  hypothetical
performance  had  they  continued  public.  In this  case,  the  evidence  would
unequivocally  support  the  notion  that  society  would  be better  off  leaving  that
activity  to the  private  sector.  Should  the  analysis  further  uncover  that  the
performance  of  divested  firms  was  superior  when they  operated  in  competitive
(or,  alternatively,  effectively  regulated)  markets,  it  would  have  further
strengthened  the  position  that  competition  and  effective  regulation  are
important  determinants  of  divestiture  outcomes.  Finally,  should  the  analysis
reveal  that  divested  firms  operated  more  efficiently  in  countries  with  well-
developed  capital  markets  and  sound  exchange  rate,  tax,  and  credit  policies,
the  analysis  would  have  further  supported  expected  predictions.  Findings  in
the  opposite  direction  would  call  into  question  the  current  wisdom.  In  both
instances,  however,  a credible  story  of  causality  would  have  been  established.
In the  process,  substantial  knowledge  would  have  been  accumulated--for
example,  what  were the  conditions  that  led  to observed  outcomes,  and  whether
they  had to  do  with the  nature  of ownership,  sector  characteristics,  the  macro
environment,  or the  terms  of the  deal.  The  analysis  would  have  provided  a
piece  of evidence  in  which  the  assumptions  are  made  explicit,  rather  than
buried  Implicitly  in  rhetoric,  thus  inviting  others  to objectively  contradict-29-
or support  the  finding. The  ultimate  beneficiary  of all  would  have  been
policymakers,  especially  those  embarking  on divestiture  programs.-30-
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